Partnering for Strategic Resilience: Forging a Brazil-Europe Rare Earth Partnership

Thank you for bringing us together.

This roundtable matters because rare earths are no longer a niche mining topic. They sit at the intersection of industrial competitiveness, energy security, defence readiness and technological sovereignty. When China tightened export licensing in 2025, Europe learned again that what looks like a procurement issue is in fact a systems issue. The vulnerability is not only at the mine. It also sits in separation, metallisation, magnet production, recycling and, increasingly, in price formation itself. That is why I would frame our challenge very clearly: This is not only a raw materials question. It is a question of industrial capability and strategic resilience. And, that is also why Brazil matters so much to us. 

Brazil is not simply resource-rich. Brazil is strategically re-entering the rare earth chapter with world-class geology, policy ambition, scientific capability, renewable power and growing international attention. 

From a European perspective, that is exactly the kind of partner we should want to work with. Europe does not need a new quarry. Europe needs trusted partners to build resilient value chains. Brazil, in turn, has every reason to move up the value chain and capture more industrial value on Brazilian soil. 

So the right model is not extract and ship. It is co-develop and industrialise. That approach is now more urgent than ever. 

Yesterday’s Serra Verde transaction, with the US strategically investing into a key Brazilian rare earth asset, made it unmistakably clear that Brazil is already central to the contest for non-China rare earth supply, especially in the heavy rare earth segment.  The strategic window is open, but it will not stay open indefinitely. So our conversation today should be practical, forward-looking and anchored in partnership.

Brazil already offers a strong foundation for that partnership: major reserves, a proven mining culture, strong engineering talent, competitive renewable energy and a government that is clearly giving more strategic attention to rare earths and downstream value creation. 

For Europe, that is not a reason for caution. It is a reason for engagement. 

The best Brazil-Europe model is one in which both sides become stronger because the value chain is built with intention from the beginning.To build that partnership well, we also need to be precise about what Europe actually needs.

Generic discussions about rare earth tonnes are no longer enough. In permanent magnets, neodymium and praseodymium remain the economic engine of the basket. Without NdPr, most projects struggle to finance because NdPr still anchors the revenue case.

But the real strategic bottleneck sits in dysprosium and terbium. Dy and Tb are small in tonnage, but they give magnets the coercivity and heat resistance required for electric drivetrains, wind turbines, robotics, aerospace and defence applications. 

Europe therefore needs not only volume, but the right feedstock: mixed concentrate, mixed carbonate or mixed intermediate with meaningful Dy and Tb relevance, especially from ionic-clay systems and other sources that can strengthen ex-China heavy rare earth supply.

Yttrium and the broader heavy rare earth suite matter as well, both for basket economics and for specialised high-tech uses. 

But in magnet strategy, Dy and Tb are the pinch point inside the pinch point.

In very short form, the value chain runs from ore to concentrate or mixed carbonate, to separated oxides, to metals and alloys, to magnets, and then into motors, generators and strategic systems. 

• The mine gives optionality.
• Separation gives chemical control.
• Metallisation gives manufacturability.
• Magnet-making captures strategic value

Because that is where qualification, customer lock-in and the direct connection to automotive, wind, robotics, data infrastructure and defence really sit.

There is also a basket logic we should not ignore. 

Lanthanum and cerium may be lower-value products, but if they have nowhere to go, the economics of the whole project weaken. 

So mine-to magnet is not a slogan. It is the industrial battlefield.

The new IEA report makes this unmistakably clear.  Permanent magnets account for around 95 percent of rare earth demand by value. In 2024, China accounted for 60 percent of global magnet rare earth mining, 91 percent of refining, and 94 percent of permanent magnet production. The IEA also shows that demand for magnet rare earths outside China is expected to rise by about 50 percent by 2035. To meet that demand, ex-China capacity needs to expand by roughly two times in mining, four times in refining and six times in magnet production, on top of what is already planned.

That message matters for Europe, but it should also give us confidence. 

Europe is not starting from zero. Europe already has serious industrial foundations in Solvay, Carester and Caremag, Neo in Estonia, VAC, MagREEsource, strong OEM demand, and institutions such as the EIB, KfW and EIT RawMaterials, leading the ERMA that can help connect innovation, investment and market development. 

The opportunity now is to connect those capabilities more effectively with reliable partners such as Brazil.

Europe also brings something very important to this discussion: a high-value downstream market in conjunction with a respective technological leadership and a unique sectorial skills and education system.  Europe is one of the world’s largest magnet-consuming industrial regions. - And industry heavy Germany, as a global manufacturing powerhouse, is the single biggest importer of permanent magnets. 

That means collaboration with Europe is not only about financing or policy alignment. It is also about anchoring real long-term demand in automotive, wind, industrial equipment, aerospace and defence-related applications. 

For Brazil, that creates the opportunity of building projects against credible industrial pull. 

For Europe, it creates the possibility of securing diversified supply with trusted partners rather than depending on a single external system.

The IEA’s financing message is equally important. The investment need is substantial, but still modest compared with the economic damage of a major disruption. 

That means resilience is not a luxury. It is an industrial necessity. Now, when we look internationally, we should be clear-eyed and constructive. 

The United States has moved from being a market observer to being a market shaper. It is using public capital, offtake structures, floor-price support, stockpiling and diplomacy together. The lesson is not that Europe should copy every American instrument. 

The lesson is that strategic value chains are now being built with coordinated finance, policy and industrial demand.

Japan offers another important lesson. Japan has shown that supply security is built through patience, long-term partnerships, technology development, stockpiles and demand-side innovation. Australia, too, is showing how strategic reserves and offtake support can reinforce diversification.

Europe should study these approaches carefully, not defensively, and adapt what is useful to its own model.

In my view, two instruments are particularly relevant for our discussion today.

First, a floor price or a contract-for-difference can be a useful bridge. It can help a strategic project reach final investment decision, support debt financing and give early offtakers the confidence to commit. In that sense, a time-bound price-protection mechanism can be justified.

Second, stockpiling can also play a legitimate role as part of preparedness. A strategic buffer is relatively inexpensive compared with the cost of disruption. But both tools must be designed carefully. A floor price should be targeted, time-bound, disciplined and linked to real offtake and upside sharing. Stockpiling should focus on the right material in the right form and be coordinated and rotated intelligently. 

Ore is not the same as oxide. Oxide is not the same as metal. Metal is not the same as magnet. And that leads to the strategic point for Europe. 

Bridge tools and emergency buffers are useful. But in the long term, Europe also needs fair and transparent price discovery, benchmark governance and delivery terms that reflect diversified supply chains, rather than relying only on imported pricing logic. 

If Brazil and Europe want long-term projects to be bankable on fair terms, then transparent price formation is part of the industrial architecture, not a side issue.

So let me put four practical collaboration propositions on the table for Brazil and Europe.

First, focus on feedstock quality, not only volume. If we are serious about magnets, we need supply streams that are relevant for NdPr economics and for Dy and Tb security.

Second, build staged industrial corridors. 

Some steps will make more sense in Brazil, some in Europe, but the principle should be shared value creation: feedstock, separation, metals, magnets, recycling, qualification and downstream manufacturing linked through long-term partnership.

Third, move OEMs and industrial buyers into the centre of the strategy. 

European industry cannot remain a passive observer. Long-term offtake, qualification support and co-investment are essential if strategic projects are to move at speed.

Fourth connects finance with market building. Public and blended finance from institutions in Europe and Brazil should not only help individual projects. It should also help create the infrastructure that makes the market more investable: data, standards, traceability, delivery terms and eventually benchmark-quality price points.

And I would add one final enabling factor: skills and innovation. 

A durable Brazil-Europe rare earth corridor should include joint work on research, pilot capability, workforce development and recycling, because the countries that master the full knowledge base of the value chain will also be the countries that capture the long-term industrial benefit.

This roundtable is exactly the right place for that conversation, because Brazil and Europe are highly complementary. Brazil brings resource potential, mining capability, growing policy momentum and the ambition to capture more value domestically.

Europe brings downstream industrial demand, midstream know-how, recycling capability, engineering, financing capacity and access to high-value end markets. Put those together, and this is not a transactional trade relationship. It is a strategic co-development opportunity.

Let me close with one central thought. 

Brazil has the opportunity to become not only a major producer of rare earth materials, but a shaper of the next generation of diversified value chains. Europe has the opportunity to become not only a buyer of strategic materials, but a stronger industrial partner from separation to metals to magnets to end-use systems.

If we get this right, we do more than diversify supply. — We create a sustainable, resilient and bankable magnet ecosystem. One that secures the right feedstock. 

One that moves from concentrate to oxide to metal to magnet. 

One that respects Brazil’s development ambition and strengthens Europe’s industrial resilience at the same time.

That, to me, is the real opportunity before us. 

Thank you.

Media Contact 

Elisabeth Ippel, Communications Manager , elisabeth.ippel@eitrawmaterials.eu 

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Supported by the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), a body of the European Union, EIT RawMaterials was established in 2015 to advance Europe’s transition to a sustainable economy. Its mission is to secure a sustainable supply of raw materials for Europe, close material loops, and design innovative product solutions, with the goal to position raw materials as a strategic strength for Europe through innovation, education, and entrepreneurship. Learn more at www.eitrawmaterials.eu